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Abstract 
Banks have a central role in any economy. They mobilize funds, allocate capital  and play a decisive role in the 
corporate gove rnance of other firms. All this means that,  when banks are efficient, they stimulate productivity 
growth and the prosperity of the  whole economy. On the other hand, banking crises are able to destabilize the 
economic  and political situation of nations. These strong externalities on the economy make the  corporate 
governance of banks a fundamental issue. Well-governed banks will be more efficient in their functions than 
those governed poorly (Levine, 2003). And as a result of its relevance, in the case of banks, corporate 
governance is not merely a private, but also a public affair manifest through the existence of bank regulation and 
supervision. Furthermore, not only the good governance of banks is important, but the question  arises as to 
whether it is different from other  firms. As this paper will show, banks appear  to pose new questions to the 
corporate governance problem due to their intrinsic  characteristics and their regulated condition. In the current 
European situation, where the  deregulation process has dramatically changed the competitive scenario of the 
banking  industry in the recent years, understanding the corporate governance of banks becomes an  exciting 
challenge. Given that the failure of the boards of directors and management is acknowledged  to be one of the 
major causes of the collapse of many banks (Office of the Comptroller of  the Currency, 1988), we believe that a 
better knowledge of the particular way banking  firms are and should be governed will be very helpful in 
preventing important not only private, but also social costs derived from bank failures or simply poor bank 
performance. From the banks’ perspective, the fine development of a governance system should be a main 
matter of concern and could constitute an essential strategic strength for banks willing to be competitive in the 
new EU scenario.In this paper we review the academic literature trying to understand the special characteristics 
of the corporate governance of banks and its role for the good performance of the banking firm. Our findings can 
be briefly summarized around three main questions: 
1.Why are banks different?Existing research points at diverse features, such as,regulation,supervision, capital 
structure,risk, fiduciary relationships, ownership, and deposit insurance, that would make banks special and 
thereby influence their corporate governance.  
2.What is different about the corporate governance of banks?According to past studies, boards of directors and 
takeovers, both friendly and hostile, play a weaker disciplinatory role in banks; even though boards are larger, 
more independent, have a superior number of committees and meet more often. Top executives compensation is 
higher in banking, but pay-performance sensitivity is lower. Finally, while banks present more dispersed 
ownership structures, high government participation is common all over the world.  
3. What works for banks? Within the governance system, the elements that seem to lead banks to increased 
performance,as suggested by the empirical evidence on the issue, are ownership concentration, certain levels of 
managerial shareholdings and larger boards. All this make us think that the whole understanding of the corporate 
governance problem may vary considerably with the industry and, perhaps, this could be one of the reasons 
behind the lack of more significant results in the corporate governance literature. In this sense, on top of banks, 
other sectors of the economy might benefit from this industry-specific study too by considering the potential uses 
of regulation to enhance their competitiveness.Nonetheless, it might also be important to keep in mind that the 
number of studies that focus specifically in the banking sector is not so large at the present moment and they 
have primarily been based on US banks. Therefore, it remains yet to be seen whether further research will 
confirm the current findings on the specific governance  mechanisms conducing to the improved financial 
performance of banks. It is necessary to make clear some delimitations to our study. The corporate governance 
role played by banks in other firms has been broadly touched upon in the academic literature, but it does not 
constitute the object of our research in this paper, where we are concerned with the way banks themselves are 
being governed. Finally, the surveyed  literature focuses mainly on commercial banks or universal banks that 
undertake the full  range of traditional banking services.  
 
1.Introduction 
What is corporate governance?  
There is a very wide literature on corporate governance. Research has been done both in theory and empirical 
issues. But, why has it become such a hot topic in the last years so as to attract all this unprecedented interest? 
According to Becht et al. (2002), we can find the explanation to this on a set of phenomena, such as: (1) the 
privatization wave that spread all over the world during the past two decades, (2) the pension fund reform and 
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the growth of private savings that meant increased investor activism, (3) the takeover wave of the 1980s in the 
U.S. and the 1990s in Europe, (4) the deregulation and integration of financial markets, and finally, (5) the recent 
scandals and failures that took place in some of the largest U.S. firms in the last years.  
Now that we now what brought it into the picture, we may start wondering what is  in fact all this corporate 
governance issue about. From a broad perspective, we could say  that “Corporate governance is concerned with 
the resolution of collective action  problems among dispersed investors and the reconciliation of conflicts of 
interest between various corporate claimholders. If we narrow the approach and take a straightforward agency 
perspective, focusing on the separation between ownership and control, then: “Corporate governance deals with 
the ways in which the suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment.”(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). These studies constitute today two of the most comprehensive reviews 
of the theoretical and empirical research on corporate governance. Finance without governance, legal protection 
of shareholder rights, large shareholders and takeovers, debt finance, and state ownership and cooperatives are 
the possible solutions mentioned by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) to the governance problem.  
Similarly, Becht et al. (2002) point at five mechanisms to solve the collective action problem: large shareholders, 
hostile takeovers and proxy voting contests, the board of directors, executive contracts linking compensation and 
company performance, and finally, well-defined CEOs fiduciary duties combined with class-action suits. They 
reach the conclusion that the major problem now is balancing the tradeoff between regulation of large-
shareholder supervisory power in order to protect the dispersed investors and the need to monitor managers to 
prevent them from self-dealing and abuse shareholders In their survey, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) account for 
different governance models across countries. The US and the UK have a governance system characterized by a 
strong legal protection of investors and the lack of large investors, except when ownership is concentrated 
temporarily during the takeover process. In Continental Europe (particularly, Germany) and Japan, corporate 
governance relies more in large investors and banks to monitor managers; legal protection for investors is 
weaker and hostile takeovers very uncommon. What we see in the rest of the world is heavily concentrated 
ownership in families, some outside investors and banks; and an extremely limited protection of investors. Legal 
protection of investors and concentration of ownership are considered complementary approaches to corporate 
governance. All successful governance models (Anglo-Saxon, German or Japanese) are characterized by 
protecting efficiently at least some kind of investors.  
 
2. Incentive pay 
Changing now to the use of incentive pay as a governance mechanism, Murphy (1999) makes a comprehensive 
review of the empirical and theoretical research on executive compensation. His findings suggest that pay-
performance sensitivity is positive and small, but with a tendency to increase over time. Nonetheless, the 
causality is debatable; since, on the one hand, managers may be more likely to accept performance related pays 
when they expect good performance (it is not uncommon that managers influence their own pay), and on the 
other, there is typically more room for extra compensation packages, including performance related pay, when 
the company is doing  
well. Even if it is true that there has been a stronger alignment between executives and shareholders during the 
last decades as a result of the increased reliance on equity-based forms of compensation, especially on stock 
options plans, Daily et al. (2003a) and Daily et al. (2003b), when reviewing the research on governance through 
ownership and regarding the relationship between CEO comp 
ensation (shareholdings versus salary) and firm performance, find little agreement on any strong relationship. 
Even when such relationship has been consistently demonstrated, the causality is not clear. Likewise, there is no 
firm evidence on the efficacy of the recent trend consisting on compensating members of the board of directors 
with stock (Daily et al., 2003b).  
Within the field of research that aims to find an explanation to these differences in  the corporate governance 
models prevalent around the world, two main streams of  literature stand out: the political approach and the legal 
perspective.  
 
3.Corporate governance as  a determinant of performance. 
There are numerous studies that provide us with both theory and empirical  evidence to link the governance of 
the corporation to its performance. We will briefly highlight here the main findings from the literature that 
focuses on the board of directors,  ownership structure, incentive compensation and the legal protection of 
investors.  
3.1 Board of directors 
The board of directors is known as one of the most important instruments to solve the corporate governance 
problem (Jensen, 1993), since it is the organ primarily used by other stakeholders to monitor management. 
Despite this fact, the theoretical studies on the board of directors have been quite scarce.Hermalin and Weisbach 
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(1998) construct a model that examines the determinants of board composition as a bargaining process between 
the existing directors and the CEO over the incorporation of new members on the board. Depending on the 
CEO’s perceived ability compared to potential successors, the power of the CEO in the negotiations will 
determine whether he dominates the board or, instead, he will be subject to active monitoring. The model 
predicts a number of empirical regularities: poorly performing CEOs are more likely to be replaced than well 
performing ones; the sensitivity of CEO turnover increases with the independence of the board; after poor firm 
performance, additions of independent directors to the board are more probable; the board will become less 
independent over the course of a CEO career; and last, management turnover is better explained by earnings that 
by stock returns. The model also suggests some other predictions not yet empirically tested. First,there will be 
long-term persistence in corporate governance practices. Second, when a manager is fired on the basis of private 
information, it should be followed by a fall in the stock price. Conversely, if the reason of the firing is public, the 
stock price would rise.  
And third, their last prediction is concerned with the sensitivity of the CEO salary to past performance, which 
should increase with the level of performance achieved.  
In another interesting study, Bennedsen (2002) finds two motives behind the establishment of boards when this 
is not imposed by law. In his model, besides the governance motive (boards exist because they create firm value 
by monitoring the management and governing the firm), there is a second reason (distributive motive): boards 
help solving conflicts between controlling and non-controlling owners. The strong presence of this distributive 
motive leads him to argue that increased investor protection could reduce its relative importance, permitting 
boards to be more focused on governance,  
thus boosting the value of the firm.  
3.2 Ownership structure 
Moving on to our second governance mechanism, we find that the effect of the  ownership structure on firm 
value has often been studied in relation to the level of product  market competition.  
In a very interesting paper, Nickell et al. (1997) also look for an interaction  between competition, ownership and 
performance. They use a productivity growth model  on a panel of 580 UK manufacturing companies from 1982 
to 1994 to show us, confirming previous studies, that product market competition, financial market pressure and 
shareholder control are all associated with some degree of productivity growth. Furthermore, they find some 
significant evidence that financial market pressure and shareholder control can substitute for competition as a 
disciplinatory mechanism of  
Management.However, later findings by Demsetz and Lehn conflict with this thesis (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). 
After examining the impact of ownership structure on firm value in a single regression model, they claim that the 
lost of control by the owners could be offset by a lower cost of capital or other benefits of diffuse ownership 
causing the optimal degree of ownership concentration to vary across firms according to differences in firm size, 
the instability of the environment, the presence of regulation in the industry or the amenity potential of the firm’s 
product for the owners.  
 
4. Legal aspects.  
As we have seen, whereas legal protection of minority shareholders has been shown to boost the valuation of 
banks (Caprio et al., 2003), in agreement with findings for other sectors of the economy (La Porta et al., 2000), 
bank specific regulations and supervisory practices seem to have little impact, if any, on them (Caprio et al, 
2003), Supporting Caprio et al. (2003) with new evidence on the little evidence of bank regulations on 
performance, Barth et al. (2003) address key issues in banking supervision: its structure (single versus multiple 
supervisors, central bank as a supervisor), scope  
(whether the banks’ supervisor should supervise as well other financial services industries), and independence 
(the degree to which supervisors are influenced by the political and economic power), trying to find out if there 
are related to bank profitability. Their results show a weak impact of the structure of supervision on bank 
performance (particularly, the single-supervisor system might, but only might, enhance bank profitability). No 
strong significant relationship is found. This suggests that the selection of the right supervisory structure may be 
oriented to improve other aspects of the banking system: individual bank safety and soundness and the stability 
and development of the  
banking system. 
 
5. Improvement of corporate governance at Albanian banks and CG in Raiffesisen Bank (international 
bank). 
Effective practices of corporate governance are essential for achieving and maintaining public trust and 
confidence in the banking system, both very crucial for the proper functioning of the banking sector and 
economy as a whole. Poor corporate governance leads to bankruptcy of the bank, which may cause public costs 
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and consequences considering the impact on the deposit system, and the consequences may spread on a wider 
macroeconomic scope, as may be the risk and impact to the payment systems. In addition, weak corporate 
governance can lead markets to lose confidence in the bank’s ability to manage it’s assets and liquidity, 
including deposits, which may in turn lead the bank toward a liquidity crisis. The recent changes to the law” On 
banks in the Republic of Albania” stipulate some of the principles of good corporate governance, one of them 
being the composition of the board of directors. Stipulating in the banking Law the principles of “loyalty” and 
the “conflict of interest”, not only with regards to managers and directors but also to members of the 
management or directors board and shareholders, is the concrete expression of the principle of the reliability 
obligation of the above mentioned persons to perform their duties, set out in the law and the charter, 
trustworthily and in the best interests of the society as a whole. Board members must have the right qualification 
for their positions, a clear understanding of their role in the governance of the bank, and be able to provide a 
sound judgment about its matters, and this does not apply only to financial institutions. Shortcomings in the 
composition and authority given to Boards have been evident and widely disputed. The remuneration of board 
members and senior managers also remains a very controversial issues that emerged in the OECD report 
regarding the lessons learned from the 2008 financial crisis, where the banking sector was hit most. The crises in 
the financial institutions in 2008 have been described as the most serious financial crisis, since the Great 
Depression. By mid 2008 it was clear that the crisis in the USA along with the lack of liquidity had a major 
impact on financial institutions and banks in many countries.    
The Albanian banking sector is composed of 16 banks. The presence of the foreign capital is dominant in all 
banks (Bank of Albania, 2011, p. 77) (subsidiaries of larger groups and branches of foreign banks), such as in 
Intesa San-Paolo Bank, Raiffeisen Zentrale Bank, Societe Generale, and Credit Agricole. The high degree of 
foreign ownership has brought the best experiences and banking practices in the financial system, along with 
modernisation and innovation through high-tech products. More importantly, they have contributed to 
developing high-standard organizational and corporate governance practices. 
The Albanian banks’ origin of capital includes countries like Austria, Italy, Greece, and France. According to the 
Bank of Albania (2011, p. 77), the total assets of the banking sector mount to EuR 7 billion, representing nearly 
80% of the GDP in 2010. Sixty four per cent of the total bank assets belong to the largest four banks. 
CG in Raiffesien Bank. 
The term corporate governance implies the responsible management and control of a company aimed at 
achieving long-term growth in value.  
Trusting and efficient cooperation of the various corporate bodies, protection of shareholder interests, and open 
and transparent communication are the central guidelines for Raiffeisen Bank International in implementing 
modern corporate governance. As a company listed on the stock exchange, Raiffeisen Bank International is 
committed to the principles of good and responsible corporate governance as set forth in the Austrian Corporate 
Governance Code and agrees to comply with them. These remarks on compliance with the Code refer to the new 
version of the Austrian Corporate Governance Code of January 2012.  
Transparent Information Policy  
Open and transparent communication with shareholders and the interested public is a special concern of 
Raiffeisen Bank International. We therefore offer extensive information on our website: 
• Ad hoc announcements, press releases, and IR mailings 
• Stock data: Share price chart and information 
• Analyst reports 
• Ordering and e-mail service: Requesting printed materials and joining the investor relations mailing list 
• Financial reports: Interim and annual reports 
• Financial calendar: Report publication dates and the annual meeting and dividend payment dates 
• Directors’ dealings 
• Articles of Association of Raiffeisen Bank International. 
• Facts and figures: Strategy, shareholder structure and data overview 
 
6. Summary and conclusions  
In the new deregulated EU banking scenario, where an extra pressure is set on banks’ profitability, the design of 
the right corporate governance system is a must for banks that want to be successful in the new competitive 
environment. But if banks are unlike other firms, as it has been long postulated by the economic literature, we 
may also wonder whether this singularity affects their corporate governance, and thus, makes necessary specific 
research that investigates the governance mechanisms in the particular case of the banking industry. This paper 
reviewed the academic literature that studied the corporate governance problem in the specific case of banks, 
analyzing its different features and the argued reasons behind them, as well as the role of the governance system 
for good bank performance.  
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In summary, this paper tried to make clear the important role of good governance for the success of the 
corporation, in particular if this corporation is a bank; as well as it investigated the different governance issues 
and practices when it comes to banking firms. Can we then conclude, based on existing research, that the 
corporate governance of banks is fundamentally different than in other industries? Overall, it seems that both the 
presence of regulation and the nature of their business affect the corporate governance problem in banks and this 
is reflected in the different governance structures observed. But the question is still open as to what extent the 
functioning of these corporate governance mechanisms and their relation to performance is different in banking 
compared to non-financial firms, as well as what would be the specific causes behind the different behaviors. 
However, the literature leaves unsolved some of the most publicly debated issues, such as the true value of 
enhancing the independence of the board, the impact of having a dual CEO/chairman of the board, the actual role 
played by political directors, the influence of the governance system, or the question of whom should ideally be 
the object of the bank directors’ fiduciary duties.  
This last discussion stems from the banks’ highly leveraged condition and entails  two important implications for 
the design of an efficient corporate governance system  from the regulators’ point of view. First, it can be argued 
that debtholders interests should receive greater protection, meaning that directors should owe fiduciary duties to 
them as well as to shareholders, and bank managers should always take solvency risk into consideration when 
making decisions. Second, some authors have proposed the regulation of management incentives as a more 
efficient tool than capital requirements to monitor risk-taking by the bank.  
Finally, most of the work reviewed here deals with US and, sometimes, Japanese banks. Given the existence of 
different governance systems and the particular impact that institutions have in the banking sector, only further 
research on the corporate governance of banks across countries will allow us to tell whether these observed 
specific features are confirmed internationally; or, if this was not the case, the different governance solutions 
respond to the existence of diverse national institutions or even individual firm-specific needs.  
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